According to the IMF, the economic challenges that plagued Asia and the Pacific are starting to fade, and conditions there are already improving. IMF stated that these developments are assisting in improving prospects throughout the region, with growth expected to accelerate.

Despite the competitive nature of India and China’s relationship on the global stage, both countries have the potential to expand their role in the global business landscape. Both countries have enjoyed significant internal growth, which has not yet been matched by their global business position. MNEs from both countries have internationalized in very distinct ways, with minimal overlaps. Their capacity to reach their potential is dependent on legislation and institutions in their home country, as well as entrepreneurial business leadership.

Their future internationalization is only partially dependent on each other. This means that the internationalization strategy of one country’s MNEs has little bearing on the strategy of the other. It is also worth noting that there has been a considerable global shift of R&D internationalization towards emerging Asia, with a steady shift of the global innovation focus to developing countries. This is reflected in rising R&D spending by Asian governments and corporations (K, 2022).

Figure 1:China and India GDP per capita, 1980-2014 (source)

Between 1980 and 2008, China had an average yearly GDP growth rate of 9 percent, whereas India’s growth rate was around 6 percent. Since 1991, the Indian economy has performed admirably. Following the reforms, real GDP per capita is now 3.5 times greater, and India has become the world’s third largest economy in terms of buying power parity.  As of 2021, China had the world’s second largest economy, with a nominal GDP of $16.64 trillion, and India had the world’s fifth largest economy, with a nominal GDP of $3.05 trillion. China is top in terms of purchasing power parity, and India is third. In nominal and PPP terms, both countries account for 21% and 26% of total world wealth, respectively (Comparing China and India by Economy, 2021).

Both India and China are fast developing, and the rest of the world is watching. Despite their initial acceptance of socialism economics in the middle of the twentieth century, India and China have gone their different ways. As India transitions to a more typical free-market system, China promotes a command economy while utilizing capitalism where appropriate. The two countries have very distinct political and economic systems, as well as vastly divergent international agendas.

In terms of economic characteristics, China and India differ since China’s manufacturing sector is more developed, whereas India’s service sector is more developed. The Chinese economy is export-oriented, whereas the Indian economy is primarily concerned with domestic consumption. Currently, India’s economy is growing faster than China’s, despite China having a higher GDP per capita. According to the World Bank, China’s GDP in 2021 will be 5.46 times higher than India’s in nominal terms, and 2.61 times higher in PPP terms. However, India’s GDP growth rate exceeded China’s in the previous quarter (Lasarte, 2023).

Bilateral Trade Between India and China

Bilateral trade between India and China has grown dramatically since the turn of the century, with China becoming India’s top trading partner by 2008. Despite the border impasse in eastern Ladakh in 2020 and the following deterioration of diplomatic ties, bilateral commerce reached an all-time high of US$ 135.98 billion in 2022, representing an 8.4% year-on-year increase. However, the trade balance is strongly skewed in favor of China, with India’s trade deficit exceeding $100 billion for the first time in 2022. India’s exports to China fell 37.9% to US$ 17.48 billion, while imports from China rose 21.7% to US$ 118.5 billion (Bhardwaj, 2023).

The main items of India’s exports to China include iron ore, organic chemicals, cotton, ores, slag and ash, copper, marine products, plastics, and gems and jewelry. The top commodities that India imports from China are electrical machinery and equipment, nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, organic chemicals, fertilizers, iron and steel, optical and medical instruments, and furniture. India has been trying to diversify its export basket to China by enhancing its competitiveness in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, IT services, agriculture products, and textiles (Singh, 2022).

Bilateral investment flows between India and China have also expanded dramatically in recent years, while they remain significantly below than the potential. As per the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the total Chinese investment in India was expected to exceed $10.15 billion by the end of 2020  (Trade and Economic Relations, n.d.).

Power generation and transmission, autos, electronics, telecommunications, engineering and construction, chemicals, e-commerce, and renewable energy are among the primary areas that have drawn Chinese investment.

According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, cumulative Indian investment in China reached US$ 1.08 billion by the end of 2019. Pharmaceuticals, IT services, commerce, textiles, chemicals, plastics, and engineering goods are among the primary areas that have drawn Indian investment (Trade and Economic Relations, n.d.).

Indian companies in China

With the rise of bilateral trade between India and China in recent years, numerous Indian businesses have begun to establish operations in China to serve both domestic and international clients.

Indian businesses operating in China are engaged in a range of industries, including trading, banking, and related activities; manufacturing (including wind energy, pharmaceuticals, refractories, laminated tubes, auto components, etc.); IT and IT-enabled services (including software solutions, IT education, and specialized software products); and associated activities (Trade and Economic Relations, n.d.). These companies may operate through representative offices, WOFE (wholly owned foreign enterprises), or through joint ventures with Chinese companies. The Indian commercial community is mainly concentrated in key port cities like Shenzhen and Guangzhou. But it’s also extensively distributed in areas like Yiwu in Zhejiang that have warehouses and wholesale markets (Bhardwaj, 2023).

The majority of Indian enterprises are located in Shanghai, China’s financial center, while a minor number have established themselves in Beijing, the country’s capital. Some of the Indian companies in China operational in China are Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Aurobindo Pharma, Matrix Pharma, NIIT, Bharat Forge, Infosys, TCS, APTECH, Wipro, Reliance Industries, SUNDARAM Fasteners, Mahindra & Mahindra and TATA Sons (Trade and Economic Relations, n.d.).

Chinese Companies in India

Despite efforts to address the border issue, India-China tensions remain high. Yet, according to the government, up to 80 Chinese enterprises were actively doing business in the nation in 2021. According to Indian government, while 92 Chinese companies were registered in India, 80 of them had the status of ‘active’ in 2021 (DNA, 2021). The number of Chinese companies registered in India increased to 174 in 2022. According to government data, in the same year, there were 3,560 Indian companies that had Chinese directors (PTI, 2022).

Chinese enterprises have a significant market share in India, particularly in the smartphone sector. In June 2022, Chinese smartphone makers dominated 79% of India’s smartphone market share, up from 75% in the previous year. Xiaomi had a 24% market share. Vivo had a 15% market share. Realme had a 15% market share. Oppo had a 10% market share (Jalan, 2021).

In 2023, 54 Chinese Foreign Direct investment proposals were pending for approval with the government[1]. There has been a gradual shift in the government’s stance on Chinese FDI, which has been blocked since the increase of Sino-Indian border tensions in 2020. However, after persistent demand from global and Indian corporations in mobile devices and other sectors of electronics, some leeway has been granted. The government has now requested that Indian companies offer a list of Chinese suppliers that are eager to set up joint ventures with Indian companies and would like to relocate some capacity to India. Following a preliminary government review, the Chinese companies will have to arrange a joint venture with Indian partners. Chinese businesses will be required to give their Indian joint venture partners a majority 51 percent ownership in order to establish a component manufacturing plant in the country’s full mobile device and electronics supply chain ecosystem. This will ensure that the country does not have to rely on imports from China, but can value add these crucial components in India, giving it more supply chain security. Some foreign players advocate for a 50-50 equity split, arguing that without it, most Chinese component makers may refuse to disclose their technology at all (Gupta, 2023).

Growing Uncertainty and Challenges Ahead

In World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking, China ranked 15^th while India ranked 63^rd (Ease of Doing Business Rankings). But global investors’ withdrawal from China in 2022 had been far more brutal than the $17 billion they pulled out of India, with net outflows exceeding $187 billion (Mukherjee, 2022). While on one hand, the uncertainty in terms of Foreign Direct investment keeps increasing for both the countries, the economic relations between India and China have also been on edge.

The emergence of India and China is anticipated to be the most significant occurrence in the global political economy of the 21st century. The growth of India and China is expected to be the most momentous event in the global political economy of the twenty-first century. However, both countries face the challenge of maintaining such rapid growth rates (Bertolucci, 2018). In case of China, shrinking labor force, declining productivity and tensions with the U.S are reasons that are impacting its economy in current times. For India, the biggest challenge is to attract FDI, work on infrastructure development, as well as improving the skillset of existing labor force.

There is huge potential for economic cooperation between the two countries with India’s consumption-driven economy and reliance on IT, Digital products getting complemented by China’s low-cost manufacturing and innovation in high-tech industry.

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[1]  Indian govt has 54 Chinese investment proposals pending – finance minister | Reuters

The 2020 Indian government ban on Chinese apps, including TikTok and WeChat, in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley clash, reflects a complex interplay of national security concerns, geopolitical tensions, and domestic digital ambitions, exacerbating the Indo-Chinese divide. The ban on Chinese apps in India marks a shift in the dynamic between the two countries and highlights attempts to restrict people-to-people contact through information control. This article explores the multifaceted implications of the ban on Chinese apps by Indian government in June 2020, in the aftermath of the fatal clash at the disputed Himalayan border that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers. (Post 2020). Immediately after the clash, more than 59 Chinese apps were banned, and today the number of banned apps has risen up to 138 (Nigam 2023). However, China’s reaction to the ban did not involve economic sanctions or any muscular approach, indicating its neighborhood diplomacy approach.

Techno-Nationalism or Trust Deficit?

Amidst heightened nationalist sentiment, the Indian government cited cybersecurity concerns (BBC 2020) as the primary justification, claiming potential threats to national security and user data posed by these apps. However, a deeper examination reveals a more intricate picture. While security concerns are undoubtedly a factor, the sheer scale and speed of the bans point towards a broader agenda. From Tiktok holding 40% of India’s app market to complete absence in the top 500 (Bhaya 2020) – this shift isn’t merely a defensive posture. For millions of Indian users, popular apps like TikTok and WeChat (a vital communication tool for the Indian Chinese community and Indian businessmen) became inaccessible, causing significant disruption and inconvenience. This lack of information exchange and curtailed communication channels further widen the gap between the two nations, hindering people-to-people contact. The “Boycott China” fervor and hyper-nationalist destruction videos (Jazeera 2020)[1] of smartphone and LED smashing suggest a public primed for this tech-centric patriotism.

However, the nationalist fervor did not have much effect on the trade relations between the two countries since despite simmering geopolitical tensions, mainland China dethroned the US as India’s top trading partner in fiscal 2021 (Banerji 2021). In 2022 and 2023, U.S. continued to be India’s largest trading partner (BusinessToday 2023), but China was a close second (Suneja 2021).

[2]

The deeper economic interdependence transcended geopolitical frictions, despite calls from trade organizations to boycott imports of Chinese goods (BusinessToday 2023). Considering that the techno-nationalism didn’t materialize into India’s lowered dependence on China, what it did contribute towards was establishing the trust deficit that existed between the countries. The ban on Chinese apps might appear as a temporary ripple, but it underscores a deeper disquiet in the Indo-Chinese relationship. Both nations stand at a crossroads: bridge the trust deficit eroded by Galwan Valley or risk an irreversible economic and cultural decoupling.

Domestic Digital Ambitions and Cyber Sovereignty: The ban also showcased a deliberate attempt to foster domestic alternatives and reclaim digital sovereignty by India. Take TikTok, with almost a third of its downloads coming from India. With over 120 million Indian users who relied on the platform for entertainment, communication, and even income generation, the ban undoubtedly hurts China’s interests, but also impacted Indian consumers. Yet the ban can also be seen as an attempt to assert control over India’s domestic information space and mitigate the perceived threat of Chinese dominance.

While the ban might appear protectionist to an outside observer, (Kumar 2023) argues that India’s approach to digital sovereignty emphasizes building a strong domestic digital infrastructure rather than solely excluding foreign platforms. The app ban merges well with Prime Minister Modi’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” vision of economic self-reliance and aligns with India’s broader efforts to promote its own digital ecosystem.

The Indian government actively pushes for the development of indigenous social media platforms, even finding alternatives to U.S-based apps such as Koo as a replacement for Twitter, and Moj to replace TikTok (Menon 2021). By curtailing access to Chinese alternatives, and encourages domestic technology companies, the government hopes to create a fertile ground for domestic players to flourish. India has historically been wary of Chinese influence, amplified by the unresolved border dispute. The increasing Chinese digital presence, particularly through popular apps like TikTok, raised suspicion among Indian policymakers leading to India adopting a tactic long employed by China in the realm of internet access and information control.

Citing national security concerns and data misuse by “elements hostile to India,” the government cracked down on the popular platform (Guardian 2022). While this tactic might offer a temporary economic advantage for India, it ultimately feeds into China’s grand strategy of a divided digital world, where national borders dictate online access and information flow. It also appears that India’s domestic politics which is characterized by increase in hyper-nationalism fueled by the ruling party—the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) is working towards gaining control over information-sharing platforms to curtail any dissent or criticism of the ruling party (World Report 2023). This tightening grip on digital spaces is an attempt to isolate the Indian population from the global flow of ideas and knowledge. The ban on apps like We-Chat which was used as key platform for communication by Indian businessmen with their Chinese counterparts also appears to be a deliberate attempt at hindering people-to-people contact between India and China (Sharma 2024).

Geopolitical Considerations

While cybersecurity concerns hold merit, the timing and nature of the ban suggest that geopolitical factors played a significant role. The attempts to deliberately shift away from dependence on its larger neighbor, China could be seen in India’s recent spate of actions, including restrictions on Chinese investments, customs duty hikes, and infrastructure bans (Reuters 2023).  India perceives China as a rising regional hegemon, flexing its muscles in areas like the South China Sea and Belt and Road Initiative. The ban sends a message of resistance against this dominance, asserting India’s own regional aspirations and preventing China from establishing unchecked influence. This move aligns with India’s broader efforts to forge closer ties with other democracies like the US and Japan, forming a counterbalance to China’s regional ambitions (Bala 2023).

India seeks to reduce its dependence on China’s manufacturing and trade dominance. The app ban is a symbolic step towards reducing dependence on Chinese technology and building a more self-reliant digital ecosystem (MacRae 2022). This could lead to India promoting domestic alternatives and diversifying its trade partnerships, potentially leading to a more balanced economic relationship with China in the long run. The ban also addresses concerns about Chinese tech companies potentially collecting sensitive data on Indian users and potentially sharing it with the Chinese government (Reuters 2022). This is a growing concern globally, especially with the rise of artificial intelligence and data-driven technologies. By taking control of its own digital space, India seeks to protect its national security and ensure data privacy for its citizens. India and China have historically battled for influence in their shared neighborhood. This historical competition persists today, fueling anxieties about each other’s ambitions and making it difficult to collaborate on regional issues.

Historical Memory: The historical context of the Indo-Chinese relationship further complicates the situation. The 1962 war remains a raw nerve for India, a symbol of national humiliation and betrayal. Memories of defeat feed into anxieties about Chinese intentions, making it difficult to fully trust their motives (Lidarev 2022). Every political dispute or border skirmish rekindles these anxieties, hindering progress towards amicable relations. (Lidarev 2022) explains how the war continues to shape India’s foreign policy, giving it a more muscular and realist edge.

Memories of the past are not just confined to history books. They are passed down through generations, shaping public perception and attitudes. Parents who lived through the 1962 war instill their anxieties and experiences in their children, perpetuating mistrust towards China. One way of changing that perception would have come through people-to-people contact. However, these linkages have not been fostered. What existed in the form of business relationships was also eroded through the app bans (Sharma 2024).

The India-China app ban should not be viewed merely a tech spat, but a collision of historical narratives and national aspirations contributing towards reducing linkages between populations of both countries. Recognizing the role of historical memory in shaping both nations’ actions is crucial for understanding the motivations behind the ban and its potential ramifications.

The specter of the 1962 war persistently overshadows the bilateral ties, imprinting a profound impact on the relationship. The collective psyche of India perceives this military setback as a national dishonor, thereby fostering an ingrained sense of mistrust and vulnerability towards China. This perception significantly influences India’s diplomatic stance and strategic decisions concerning China. (Lidarev 2022). Furthermore, the unresolved border issue remains a constant source of tension. The legacy of disputed territories like Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin keeps the embers of suspicion alive, making it difficult for either side to fully trust the other’s claims. This sentiment finds resonance in the widespread public support for the app ban, seen as a necessary safeguard against potential Chinese digital incursion.

Historical memory for both nations extends beyond just moments of defeat. India’s cultural identity is deeply intertwined with a long history of independent civilization, fueling a desire for self-reliance and freedom from undue foreign influence. Similarly, China looks back on its ancient empires and cultural contributions, nurturing a sense of rightful global prominence. These interwoven narratives of past glory and national pride create fertile ground for clashes over issues like technology and national security (Agarwalla 2020).

By analyzing the India-China app ban through the lens of historical memory, we move beyond superficial interpretations of a tech dispute. We see it as a complex interplay of national anxieties and aspirations, rooted in centuries of experience. The recent clash and the app ban have exacerbated these historical tensions, making it increasingly difficult for the two countries to find common ground. Media narratives and political discourses further play on historical anxieties, manipulating public opinion and exacerbating the trust deficit. Nationalist rhetoric, demonizing the other nation hinders mutual understanding and reconciliation.

Beyond mere political fallout, historical memory breeds anxieties that directly impact trust on a human level, such as the family ties across the border become strained due to political tensions, cultural exchanges and academic collaborations face the burden of suspicion. Even people-to-people contact is hampered by the weight of historical baggage (Lidarev 2012).

China’s reaction

China’s official response has been measured but critical. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed “strong concern” over the ban, calling it “discriminatory” and a violation of World Trade Organization rules (CGTN 2021). They urged India to reverse the decision and uphold the “legitimate rights and interests” of Chinese companies. Beyond official statements, China raised this issue at WTO (World Trade Organization) claiming discrimination (Mishra 2021).

Nationalist sentiment in China fueled calls for stronger countermeasures against India, and while China has used economic leverage in their foreign affairs strategy (Hu 2013), China has also shown restraint in some areas. Despite the economic losses from the app ban, China has not imposed large-scale economic sanctions on India, and it hasn’t had a significant impact on the trade relations between the two countries (Chen 2023). However, while China refrained from large-scale sanctions, it implemented targeted measures like visa restrictions and permit delays for Indian companies, impacting bilateral trade and investments. They also discouraged Chinese tourism to India and imposed an enduring travel ban barring Indian visitors, including thousands of stranded students (Krishnan 2021). This could be due to several factors, such as a desire to avoid escalating tensions further or hoping for a future diplomatic solution. The government’s actions also seek to appease domestic demands while balancing pragmatic considerations.

China’s response can be analyzed as a way to maintain leverage and signal disapproval of India’s perceived strategic realignment towards the US.  But it’s important to note that China values its relationship with India, given the latter’s growing economic and strategic importance in the region. Despite the tensions, China called for a “fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory” trade pattern with India, indicating its willingness to resolve the issues. Such approach is hallmark of China’s foreign relations in which tensions with neighbor countries isn’t allowed to blow out of proportions, as China considers having a “secure neighborhood” as key for stability (CGTN 2023).

Analysis

Having long held a near-monopoly on domestic information flow, China is now encountering the unfamiliar territory of its own apps being subject to restrictions in another nation, potentially igniting a new battleground in the ongoing struggle for control over internet spaces. India’s decision to mirror China’s tactics in the digital sphere risks further fragmenting the internet and weaponizing access to information, potentially leading to a race to the bottom in terms of online freedoms.

But the ban on Chinese apps is a symptom of the deeper tensions plaguing the Indo-Chinese relationship. While cybersecurity concerns provide a veneer of justification, geopolitical factors and the quest for digital sovereignty as part of national security are the underlying drivers. The ban demonstrates India’s willingness to take a firm stance against perceived threats from China, even if it carries economic or technological costs. This sends a strong message to both domestic and international audiences about India’s rising assertiveness on the global stage. This move could also be seen as a way to pressure China to address India’s concerns on other issues, like border disputes or trade imbalances.

The consequences of the ban are far-reaching, impacting not only individuals and businesses but also the broader bilateral relationship. The ban creates an uncertain business environment for Chinese companies looking to invest in India, potentially hindering economic relations. It also adds another layer of complexity to already strained diplomatic relations, making it more difficult to resolve existing issues and hindering progress towards bilateral cooperation.

Footnotes:

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3e7irVQG1wo&ab_channel=AlJazeeraEnglish

[2] India-China in 2023: Bilateral Trade and Investment Prospects – India Briefing News (india-briefing.com)

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—. 2023. India’s measures targeting Chinese products and investment. Aug 5. https://www.reuters.com/business/indias-measures-targeting-chinese-products-investment-2023-08-05/.

Sharma, Anchit. 2024. How To Use WeChat In India After Ban. Jan 12. https://www.forbes.com/advisor/in/business/software/how-to-use-wechat-in-india-after-ban/.

Suneja, Kritika. 2021. China is now second largest export partner of India. Jun 25. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/china-is-now-second-largest-export-partner-of-india/articleshow/83851116.cms.

2023. World Report . Human Rights Watch.

While subnational governments have the autonomy to allocate resources, make decisions about infrastructure development, and incur expenditures, they lack the authority to generate revenue through taxation to fund such expenditure.

Tax Revenue and Expenditure disparity

Local governments collect around 60% of overall taxes, but tax rates are set by the central government, and their reliance on revenue-sharing limits their authority. If one observes the contribution of decentralized fiscal policy in the growth of China with rapid infrastructure development and booming economy, it would be considered an asset to China’s economic growth. However, the subnational governments are dependent mainly on central government’s fiscal transfers, various subsidies or land finance as their primary revenue source. Land finance refers to creating revenue through land by either collecting land and property taxes or selling land usage rights (Wong C. e., 2013)

Over the previous two decades, steeply rising land prices resulted in an expanding property industry, which assisted local governments in maintaining their public spending. The share of total local government revenue from land sales climbed from 20% in 2012 (2.7 trillion yuan) to 30% in 2021 (8.7 trillion yuan) (YU, 2023).

LGFVs and China’s Debt problem

Another key source of financing for local governments that can be covered in the ambit of land finance are LGFVs (Local government financing vehicles). In China, land finance through LGFVs meant borrowing money from banks or capital markets via special-purpose corporations backed by local governments. These LGFVs are not formally included in the local government budget but are sometimes implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the local government, which owns the land and assets used as collateral for revenue sources (Kozhevnikov, 2019).

LGFVs have helped China’s urbanization and economic expansion and are considered the backbone of local governments in China when it comes to promoting infrastructure development. They are largely involved in the development of public welfare projects such as cheap housing, infrastructure, social services, and ecological and environmental protection (Sun, 2013), but they also offer fiscal and financial risks due to their high leverage, low profitability, and lack of transparency.

Since land is a finite source, this method of revenue generation is not sustainable. The extra-budget borrowing to finance the expenditure added to the local government debt which stood at trillion yuan (US$7 trillion) at the end of 2020, according to estimates (Lee, 2021). This constituted a tremendous burden on local budgets, necessitating continued borrowing for most of the municipalities that lack the capacity to pay (Wong C. , 2021).

In the absence of regulatory monitoring, these practices fueled bribery and corruption, leaving many cities in unsustainable debt. In 2014, the government in 2014 had to revise the budget law, allowing issuance of bonds by provincial governments. Despite attempts at converting the LGFV debt to local government debt and bringing bond-issuance under the purview of Central government, LGFVs continue “backdoor” borrowing. (Wingdenger, 2018) Considering the abovementioned facts and data, it can be said that China’s decentralized fiscal policy is flawed. It grants excessive responsibility to local governments but in the absence of revenue-generation mechanisms, these governments opt for unsustainable means, thus becoming an obstacle to economic growth by pushing the economy towards a debt crisis.

Unequal Growth

Furthermore, the implicit tax rate and fiscal responsibilities to sustain the running of local government vary greatly between jurisdictions due to large disparities in basic economic structures and revenue bases (Zhang, 2006). Urban local governments have more capacity for spending than their rural counterparts. In certain regions that are more dependent on agriculture or are primarily rural, fewer funds are available for local governments. The degree of industrialization and urbanization influences the economic structure and income base of different regions. The per capita GDP of coastal regions and big urban agglomerations in 2020 was much higher than that of peripheral and less urbanized counterparts, according to Statista[1]. Shanghai, for example, had a per capita GDP of 164,000 yuan, whilst Guizhou had only 38,000 yuan. From 1999 to 2009, differences in actual fiscal revenue among prefecture-level administrative regions widened, resulting in a persistent rise in the Theil index[2]. (Tan, 2019)

This impacts their level of spending on fundamental necessities of the population, such as education and health. Though increased central transfers as well as different policies targeting rural population or migrant children slow the trend of expanding regional disparities, the same remains significant.  Disparities between counties and districts within a province are also substantial, affecting vulnerable groups and marginalized communities. (Wong C. , 2019)

The regional disparities call for a centralized fiscal policy in China, as the decentralized policy is unable to deal with the inequalities or provide equitable social service provisions to all sections of society. Subnational governments do play a key role in matters of social welfare, as currently, in China’s decentralized system, important public services such as healthcare, education and social welfare are provided by local governments.  (Wong, 2021). However, a centralized system is generally associated with better allocation of resources for reducing disparities and inequalities among regions.

But China’s circumstances are unique, in the sense that it does not have a strong inter-governmental transfer system. Therefore, a centralized fiscal policy might not ensure equitable distribution, resources or reduction of disparities. Currently, these services are highly decentralized and also constitute the fastest-growing public expenditure, considering China’s ageing population and rapid urbanization (Wingdenger, 2018). In 2019, the share of expenditure among central government and local governments showed that county-level expenditure was nearly half of the total budget expenditure, while central government spent merely 15%.

Figure 1 Shares of budget expenditures in 2019. 

Despite the revamping of public finance since 1994 to develop a system capable of financing government operations and supporting economic growth, lack of equitable funding for local governments remained the Achilles heel of China’s public finance. Local finances have deteriorated since 2015 as a result of sluggish growth, tax cuts, and budgetary challenges.  (Wong, 2021). China also lacks a robust intergovernmental fiscal system that is crucial for securing appropriate funding for local governments.

Tax Reforms

As part of the Tax-Sharing mechanism Reform, China implemented an inter-governmental transfer mechanism in 1995. All taxes were divided into three categories under the reform: central taxes, municipal taxes, and shared taxes. The central government collected central taxes such as excise tax and customs tariff. Local governments collected local taxes such as land VAT and urban land use tax. Shared taxes, including as VAT and income taxes, were split between the central and local governments, with the central government receiving the lion’s share. The reform was a revenue centralization procedure that generated a significant disparity between expenditure responsibility and available local resources (Liu, 2019).

To fill this gap, the central government devised a system of intergovernmental payments comprised of three major components: tax rebates, equalization transfers, and ad hoc transfers. The tax rebate was a mechanism that guaranteed each province an amount equivalent to the local tax base reduction caused by the tax-sharing scheme. It was a “compromised” result of the reform, which sought to protect the interests of the provinces. It has, however, been less and less significant in the system over time. The equalization transfers were formula-based grants with an objective of equalization. General-purpose grants, “pre-tax sharing system” awards, minority grants, and other types were designed to eliminate regional fiscal imbalances and improve public service delivery (Liu, 2019).

Administrative overhead increased as reliance on transfers increased since inter-governmental transfers in China are made level-by-level from Central government to provincial and then to semi-provincial level units. This trickle-down transfer raises various challenges for transparency, proper utilization of funds and administrative efficiency.

Though the context and circumstances in which inter-governmental transfers were introduced is understandable, yet it also causes several issues. For example, level-by-level transfer mechanism does not address horizontal fiscal imbalances among subnational governments adequately. Transfers also tend to favor the provincial level over the lesser levels of government, particularly the county level, where the majority of public service delivery occurs. (Bihong Huang, 2012)

The Xi Jinping period

Under the Xi Jinping administration, certain governance reforms were proposed. This had three major tasks: strengthening the financial management system, upgrading the tax system, and constructing an intergovernmental structure with adequate resources and duties. (Wong C. , 2021) However, local governments’ fiscal status has deteriorated since the start of the Xi Jinping era.

In each decade, from the Zhu Rongji period (1992-2002) to the current Xi Jinping period, policies were made responding to the problems left by the previous decade. But what China needs is a complete overhaul of the tax-sharing system including tax reform, intergovernmental reform, and a new economic plan that is less reliant on investment.

The impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and social service is dependent on design of fiscal decentralization, the institutional quality and capacity of local governments as well as the accountability and transparency of fiscal management (Kim, 2021). In case of China, decentralized distribution of responsibilities is not matched with revenue sharing, leaving a big gap for local government. Due to a lack of funds, local governments in disadvantaged areas, particularly rural areas, are frequently unable to perform mandated services (Wong, 2021).

On one hand China’s decentralized fiscal system has contributed immensely to the progress made by the country in terms of infrastructure development, availability of basic services to the population all leading to the “growth miracle”. The same was needed in the period when China was still catching-up with the leading economies of the world. However, during the contemporary period, the same decentralized fiscal system has led to a position nearing a debt crisis because of the way local governments used LGFVs and shadow banking to finance the projects.

It can be argued that China’s decentralized fiscal system has both advantages and disadvantages for economic growth and provision of social services. It has enabled subnational governments to respond to local conditions and needs in a flexible manner, contributing to China’s rapid and diverse development. But it has also produced significant fiscal issues that may jeopardize China’s long-term growth prospects. The way forward for China includes restructuring its fiscal system for budgetary sustainability and efficiency.

Need of the hour

A reformed, decentralized fiscal policy would be an asset to the economic growth and social service provision of China. These reforms would include allowing subnational governments more autonomy to raise their own revenue in order to reduce their dependence on transfers and borrowing. This should be supplemented with accountability measures, including clear expenditure responsibilities, to avoid duplication of effort, wastage of resources, or conflict with other levels of government. Efforts must be made to find new sources of revenue, reduce local governments’ dependence on land finance, as reduce local government debt.

Finally, China needs a more transparent, smooth, and equitable system of intergovernmental transfers to keep corruption and administrative inefficiency in check. This could be achieved by increasing the share of general-purpose transfers, offering more discretion to subnational governments in spending as compared to specific purpose transfers. But the same must be complemented with a rule-based allocation mechanism as an accountability measure.

Bibliography

Bihong Huang, K. C. (2012). Are intergovernmental transfers in China equalizing? China Economic Review Volume 23, Issue 3, 534-551.

Kim, J. W. (2021). Fiscal policy and economic growth: some evidence from China. . Rev Worl Econ, 157, 555–582.

Kozhevnikov, M. (2019). Debt of Local Governments of China: Assessment Issues and Analysis. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 714–716 .

Lee, A. (2021, November 2). Is China’s local government debt a concern and what role do LGFVs play in infrastructure spending? Retrieved from SCMP: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3154549/chinas-local-government-debt-concern-and-what-role-do-lgfvs

Liu, Y. (2019). Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in China. Retrieved from ESCAP: https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=98df39b9ca9bca2fJmltdHM9MTY5ODUzNzYwMCZpZ3VpZD0yOTMzZGZkNS1lZWQ2LTZmZDgtMjBhMS1jY2ExZWZkMDZlOWQmaW5zaWQ9NTE4Mg&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=2933dfd5-eed6-6fd8-20a1-cca1efd06e9d&psq=Intergovernmental+Fiscal+Transfers+in+China+Yongzheng+

Sun, Y. L. (2013). Local Government Financing Platforms in China: A fortune or misfortune? IMF.

Tan, Z. (2019). A Research on the Fiscal Regional Difference of China’s Prefecture-Level Administrative Regions. Modern Economy.

Wingdenger, P. (2018, April 13). IMF. Retrieved from imf.org: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/04/13/Intergovernmental-Fiscal-Reform-in-China-45743#:~:text=China%20is%20the%20most%20decentralized%20country%20in%20the,and%20a%20build-up%20of%20debt%20outside%20the%20budget.

Wong, C. (2019). Public policy for a modernising China: The challenge of providing universal access to education under fiscal decentralisation. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Wong, C. (2021). Plus ça Change: Three Decades of Fiscal Policy and Central Local Relations in China. China: An International Journal, Volume 19, Number 4, , 1-31.

Wong, C. e. (2013). Paying for Urbanization: Challenges for China’s Municipal Finance in the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute for Land Policy.

YU, S. (2023, March 9). China’s local governments boost revenue by selling land to their own entities. Retrieved from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/f68a301a-cdd5-4d9b-aca2-492c6561ebbf

Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics Volume 34, Issue 4, 713-726.

[1] https://www.statista.com/topics/7157/regional-disparities-in-china/#topicOverview

[2] A high positive Theil index indicates more income than population while a negative value shows more population than income.

Understanding the Aging Wave

China’s demographic landscape is undergoing a profound transformation due to the rapid aging of its population. China’s aging population, driven by the one-child policy of 1979 and rising life expectancy, has tilted the demographic pyramid: fewer young people supporting a growing number of older adults (Barry, 2022).

Figure 1: Population by Age for China: 2020 and Projected 2060 (In millions)

1. Economic Implications:

(Shen & Wang, 2018) shed light on the escalating “state dependency ratio,” a metric measuring the number of retirees relying on working-age individuals. This ratio’s meteoric rise poses a substantial threat to the sustainability of China’s pension system, potentially magnifying inequality and social unrest. The World Bank report, “Healthy China,” (2019) advocates for strategic investments in efficient healthcare systems and active aging strategies as imperative measures to mitigate the financial and social burdens associated with the aging population.

While the looming pension crisis and social pressures associated with China’s aging population threaten a similar fate as Japan, the story needn’t end the same way.  (Meng, 2023) debunking the “demographic dividend” myth proposes a nuanced argument that demography, while influential, is not an absolute harbinger of destiny. He exposes the fallacies of framing a growing workforce as a guaranteed “demographic dividend” while underscoring the need for proactive measures to address the shrinking workforce.

Meng’s argument holds significant implications for China’s future trajectory and can also be justified using the example of India. India boasts a youthful demographic, projected to peak around 2030. While on surface this presents a potentially sizable workforce dividend, concerns loom large considering the decline of overall labor force participation rates and youth unemployment (Parida, 2023). Fostering automation and prioritizing workforce upskilling would be crucial for maintaining China’s economic competitiveness despite a declining labor force. Furthermore, investing in preventive healthcare and encouraging active lifestyles to prolong productive years and reduce healthcare costs associated with age-related illnesses would lower the burden on state system.

1. Social Dynamics and Opportunities:

The repercussions of the demographic shift extend beyond mere statistical changes, penetrating the core of societal structures. Framing the aging population solely as an economic burden overlooks nuanced aspects.

On one hand, (Zhao, 2021) talks about how changing social policies in China are affecting how people view elderly care. While discussing the traditional view that children should be the main caregivers for their elderly parents, the article suggests that there is a growing trend of people believing that the government, children, and the elderly themselves should all share responsibility for elderly care. This change is likely due to the fact that the government has become more involved in providing elderly care services in recent years.

On the other hand, Qi (2018) explains how “floating grandparents”—elderly individuals becoming caregivers for their grandchildren are facilitating workforce participation of urban migrants. In communities, this phenomenon is creating networks of intergenerational support and changing familial relationships. A more holistic approach to elderly care, emphasizing the integration of family support, social insurance, and community-based services would reframe the perspective of aging population from a challenge to an avenue for social innovation. There is a need for reimagining the structures that support the elderly.

Marriage and Family in Modern China: Changing Landscape

China’s marriage and family landscape are witnessing a seismic shift, challenging traditional norms rooted in Confucian values. Last year, the number of marriages in China fell to 6.83 million, the lowest since records began in 1986 (Hawkins, 2023). The diminishing marriage rate illuminates societal transformation, with Chinese policymakers worried about what the downward trend could mean for Chinese economy. While the one-child policy laid the demographic groundwork for this re-verticalization, ongoing economic restructuring, legal reforms, and cultural shifts continue to fuel it.

(Davis, 2021) argues that recent economic anxieties have placed renewed emphasis on the parent-child axis, with parents becoming overly involved in spouse selection. This prioritization of parent-child relationships over spousal bonds is likely to have significant implications for contemporary urban society.

(Davis, 2014) suggests that the “privatization of marriage” signifies a shift towards consensual and egalitarian unions. However, the Chinese government’s prohibitions on non-marital childbearing limits parenthood to marriage regardless of ethnicity, religion, or educational background. With greater individual agency among the younger generations and growing emphasis on individual aspirations over established familial expectations (Instructor Lecture, 2023), young adults no longer see marriage as an automatic step after graduation, but a conscious decision based on compatibility, emotional fulfillment, and shared goals.

However, the evolving legal landscape, with cases like the egg-freezing lawsuit (Li & Wang, 2022), illustrates the legal and ethical quandaries arising from these new family formations. While the court ultimately denied the single woman’s request to freeze her eggs, the case ignited a nationwide debate about reproductive rights, family definitions, and the role of technology in shaping parenthood. The incident highlights the lack of evolution to accommodate the adaptation of shifting dynamics in family structures. As a result, the decline in marriage and birth rates continues to contribute to the overall population decrease, intensifying challenges associated with the aging population.

This demographic trend raises uncomfortable questions: Can China continue to thrive with fewer working hands to support its growing elderly population? Can China’s economy survive the continued decline in workforce?

Demography as Destiny: A Nuanced Perspective

The two demographic trends—an aging population and changing marriage dynamics—will undoubtedly influence China’s destiny, but not in a predetermined or monolithic manner. The answer to China’s demographic destiny isn’t a binary choice; it lies in navigating the nuances of both, embracing individual agency while ensuring societal sustainability.

Policy Implications

Ultimately, the influence of these trends on China’s destiny hinges on its adaptability and responsiveness to these demographic shifts. Proactive policies aimed at healthcare reform, workforce development, family support, and social inclusion can mitigate challenges and unlock opportunities.

Aging Wave: Navigating the Currents, Not Succumbing to the Tide

Framing the ageing population as solely a demographic curse paints an incomplete picture. The strain on healthcare systems due to the aging population necessitates robust reforms and an analysis of predicted burden on state paraphernalia. Investments in healthcare infrastructure should not only focus on addressing current needs but also anticipate future demands. Firstly, China must consider the potential for proactive adaptation. Investments in automation, reskilling the workforce, and promoting active aging can mitigate the impact of a shrinking workforce (Zhao, 2021).

Another major challenge is the rural-urban divide in availing benefits of state schemes and policies. (Walder, 2023) talks about four main factors that have contributed to China’s extreme inequality: the legacy of state socialism, the rapid growth of the economy, the one-child policy, and the rise of a property bubble. He argues that China’s inequality is not an immutable fate and proposes pathways to bridge the gap. These include urging for action against corruption, tax system reform, and investments in education and healthcare. Addressing the complex interplay of factors fueling inequality is crucial for China to navigate the turbulent currents of social discontent and chart a more equitable course for its future (Walder, 2023).

Secondly, a proactive approach involves integrating technological advancements into healthcare delivery, ensuring accessibility, and promoting preventive care to alleviate the burden on the system. China’s vibrant entrepreneurial spirit and technological prowess can be harnessed to develop solutions for an aging population. For example, telemedicine and AI-powered care systems can address healthcare needs and reduce caregiver burdens. Also, tailored strategies for active aging become imperative. Initiatives promoting physical and mental well-being, community engagement, such as elder-universities, can contribute to a more resilient and empowered elderly population.

Changing Marriage Dynamics: Legal and Social Adaptations

As family structures diversify, legal frameworks must adapt to ensure equitable treatment and protection of individuals’ rights. This means reevaluating reproductive rights to accommodate the changing dynamics of family life.

This also includes fostering policies that support both career aspirations and family formation, recognizing diverse family structures, and fostering legal frameworks that adapt to the evolving realities of love and parenthood.

Merely, attempting to reverse the effects of one-child policy through encouraging families to have three children (Mcdonell, 2021) would not be sufficient. The study by (Zhang, Yang, Kim, & Fong, 2023) reveals that the aspirations for two or three children among parents significantly diminished over time, with most couples by 2019 favoring one child or none at all. This substantial decline can be attributed to different factors, including the escalating cost of living, encompassing education, housing, and healthcare. These impose significant economic constraints on expanding family size.

Additionally, shifting career aspirations, particularly among women prioritizing professional advancement, present logistical challenges regarding childcare and managing larger families. Furthermore, changing marriage dynamics, characterized by declining rates and rising divorces, contribute to lower birth rates by destabilizing traditional family structures. Notably, the one-child policy’s legacy lingers even after its relaxation, as societal expectations around family size and anxieties about raising multiple children persist. This underscores the crucial role of individual preferences and evolving social norms in shaping fertility decisions, cautioning against simplistic assumptions that policy adjustments alone will automatically reverse declines in birth rates.

The findings raise concerns about China’s aging population and potential economic consequences of a shrinking workforce, emphasizing the need for policymakers to implement multifaceted approaches to support families and foster environments conducive to realizing desired family sizes.

Still, the role of technology in shaping China’s demographic destiny cannot be overstated. From addressing labor shortages to redefining family structures, technological advancements offer transformative solutions. Platforms like egg freezing and advancements in assisted reproductive technologies provide individuals with greater control over their reproductive choices. Policymakers need to navigate these developments carefully, ensuring that legal frameworks safeguard individual rights while addressing potential concerns like disparities in access.

In response to the challenges posed by a shrinking workforce, China must embrace automation and invest significantly in upskilling programs (Meng, 2023). Collaborations between the government, educational institutions, and industries can ensure that the workforce remains adaptable and equipped with the necessary skills to thrive in a technologically advanced environment.

Analyzing the validity of “demography is destiny”

While the adage “demography is destiny” captures a crucial relationship, it is essential to avoid determinism. Social contexts and policy interventions can shape the contours of how demographic trends impact society. China’s case exemplifies this complexity. The interplay between these demographic trends and other factors like technological advancements, political decisions, and cultural shifts will determine the specific character of China’s future.

“Demography is destiny” should be viewed as a reminder of the dynamic interplay between population trends and other forces. While demographic shifts set broad parameters, policy choices and cultural values play a pivotal role in determining the future prospects. Though challenges are evident, ranging from economic strains to shifting family structures, proactive policy interventions and cultural adaptability can transform these challenges into opportunities.

The multifaceted nature of the aging population and evolving marriage dynamics requires a comprehensive approach. As family structures evolve, a delicate balance must be maintained to ensure that cultural traditions are respected while embracing the changing dynamics. Education and public awareness campaigns can foster understanding of these shifts reducing societal resistance.

In the case of China, the journey forward involves embracing complexity and leveraging the potential offered by a society in flux. As China navigates its demographic destiny, it stands at a crossroads where strategic decisions and innovative solutions will shape the trajectory of its future.

Bibliography

Barry, A. (2022, September 1). As China’s population ages, the one-child policy generation face an obligation they can’t fulfil. Retrieved from ABC News: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-09-01/china-ageing-population-burdening-one-child-policy-generation/101389682

Davis, D. (2014). Privatizing Marriage in Postsocialist China. Modern China, 551-577.

Davis, D. (2021). We Do: Parental Involvement in the Marriages of Urban Sons and Daughters. Chinese Families: Upside Down, 31-54.

Hawkins, A. (2023, Jun 13). Marriages in China drop to record low despite government push. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/14/marriages-in-china-drop-to-record-low-despite-government-push#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20marriages%20in,since%20records%20began%20in%201986.

(2019). Healthy China: Deepening Health Reform in China: Building High-Quality and Value-Based Service Delivery. World Bank.

Instructor Lecture. (2023, Dec 11).

Li, Y., & Wang, X. (2022, July 26). Chinese Court rules against Single Woman Who Wanted to Freeze Her Eggs. Retrieved from Caixin Global.

Mcdonell, S. (2021, May 31). China allows three children in major policy shift. Retrieved from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-57303592

Meng, X. (2023). The People’s Republic of China’s 40-Year Demographic Dividend and Labor Supply: The Quantity Myth. Asian Development Review, 111-144.

Parida, J. M. (2023). Harnessing Demographic Dividend Before it is Lost Forever in India. Ind. J. Labour Econ. 66, 61–79.

Qi, X. (2018). Floating grandparents: Rethinking family obligation and intergenerational support. Internal Sociology, 761-777.

Shen, K., & Wang, F. (2018). A Benevolent State Against an Unjust Society? Inequalities in Public Transfers in China. Chinese Sociological Review, 1-26.

Walder, A. G. (2023). China’s Extreme Inequality: The Structural Legacies of State Socialism. The China Journal no.90 , 1-26.

Zhang, C., Yang, A. Z., Kim, S., & Fong, V. L. (2023). Why Parents’ Fertility Plans Changed in China: A Longitudinal Study. The China Quarterly, 193-226.

Zhao, L. ,. (2021). Filial Piety, Pension Policy and Changing Perceptions of Elderly Care Responsibility. China: An International Journal, 112-131.

Executive Summary

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[1], in force for over 50 years, faces significant challenges in the face of modern biological threats. Experts opine that chemical and biological weapons are considered by rogue states and non-state actors as viable alternatives to nuclear weapons, posing a formidable threat.[i]

As we navigate the complexities of the 21st century, including the stark realities highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, there are concerns about the convention’s relevance and effectiveness to address the evolution of biological threats. The pandemic underscored the damaging effects of diseases on societies, whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in origin. It has also highlighted the potential consequences of biohazard, if biological weapons are developed by nefarious actors.

While the BWC remains a cornerstone in the prevention of biological warfare, augmenting its capabilities is paramount. The conventional mechanisms of the BWC are under strain, prompting a call for innovative solutions that can address the multifaceted challenges posed by modern biological threats.

This policy brief calls for strengthening the ties between bio-tech industry, scientific experts and BWC implementation support unit to ensure the resilience of BWC to address global catastrophic biological threats. Prompt action in this direction is key to reinforcing global biosecurity for present and future generations.

Background

When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons was negotiated in 1969, it marked the initial stride toward a comprehensive ban on biological weapons by prohibiting the development, production, and possession of biological arms.[2]

However, in recent times, there has been a noticeable shift in global biosafety concerns, moving away from a primary emphasis on prohibiting biological weapons to a more comprehensive approach focused on preventing bioterrorism, addressing the misuse of dual-purpose biotechnology, and managing broader health and safety issues[3].

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has emphasized the growth of Global Catastrophic Biological Risks, representing unprecedented biological threats capable of causing immense damage to human civilization, jeopardizing its long-term prospects[4]. Unchecked, a global biological catastrophic event could result in significant loss of life, societal upheaval, enduring harm to governments and economies, strain on international relations, and a threat to global security. A critical aspect to consider is that with rapid advancement of biotechnology, thousands of individuals globally have access to pathogenic materials and genetic engineering tools.

In October 2011, the WMD Center, a nonprofit organization issued a report predicting the likelihood of a terrorist-sponsored WMD strike globally by 2013, with a particular emphasis on the probable use of a biological weapon (Bob Graham, 2011) . The report specified how the United States lacked readiness to address a worldwide outbreak of a lethal virus without available medical countermeasures. The prediction of a terrorist-sponsored strike didn’t materialize, but the 2019 pandemic highlighted a familiar truth for those in biodefense, public health, or medicine: the world is not prepared to handle biohazardous outbreaks. 

Synthetic Biology— potential for Bioterrorism

Synthetic biology, being an emerging technology, is a research field characterized by dual-use properties. On one hand, the rapid advancements in key biotechnologies like DNA synthesis and assembly, genome editing, gene drive, and adaptive evolution, has become a catalyst for numerous innovations in sectors such as agriculture, energy, manufacturing, and pharmacy (Tao Sun, 2022). On the other hand, advancement in biotechnology gives rise to biosecurity risks predominantly associated with potential bioterrorism activities[5].

Synthetic biology facilitates the revival and construction of dangerous bacteria or viruses, since genetic sequences of highly pathogenic microorganisms are easily accessible on freely downloadable platforms like GenBank. The synthesis of various viral genomes is now feasible at low costs through commercial services (Tao Sun, 2022). Easy access to genetic sequences, lowering costs and the expansion of amateur biological groups tapping into a pool of widespread knowledge and skills contribute to the apprehensions of bioterrorism.  (Fangzhong Wang, 2019).

Furthermore, freely accessible academic journals provide methods for enhancing the pathogenicity and transmission of dangerous viruses or bacteria. The technical barriers for designing and synthesizing dangerous microorganisms have significantly diminished. Synthetic biology technologies are more accessible than ever due to commercialization. Traditional regulations related to pathogen and laboratory management are inadequate in addressing synthetic biology challenges. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity has raise varied concerns related to the risks associated with synthetic biology, driven by alarming incidents prompting the need for dual-use research oversight mechanism  (Fangzhong Wang, 2019) [6].  Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s counterterrorism coordinator, cautioned the possibility of terrorists leveraging drones to disseminate these viruses.

Genome-editing Biotechnology- A weapon of Mass Destruction?

CRISPR/Cas9, a groundbreaking genome-editing technology, has significantly impacted synthetic biology by enhancing the accuracy and efficiency of editing genomes in various organisms. The affordability and accessibility of the CRISPR technique, with its basic components available online for a mere $60, have stirred concerns. The ease and low cost of operation increase the risks of intentional abuse.

The U.S. Intelligence Agency suggests the potential weaponization of CRISPR/Cas9 as a mass destruction tool (Regalado, 2016). It emerged as the only biotechnological concern amid a compilation of six conventional threats[7], that potentially breach international agreements.[8] Scientists and policy analysts suggest that accidents with gene editing could be catastrophic considering genome is the very essence of life. But until now, the discourse on modifying the genetic makeup in the scientific community has predominantly revolved around ethical considerations. However, it is conceivable to envision a scenario where a virus is engineered to harm individuals by manipulating their genetic structures.

Problems

►        The BWC lacks a comprehensive verification mechanism to ensure compliance, making it difficult to detect clandestine programs.

►        Dual-Use dilemma makes it challenging to develop a verification system that could distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities.

►        Some key terms, like “biological agents,” remain undefined, creating loopholes for dual-use research and development (R&D) with potential military applications.

►        States do not want to subject their military and research facilities to international inspections, citing national security concerns and concerns about intellectual property rights.

►        BWC has no mechanism to be invoked in case of accidental outbreak of disease due to mishandling of a biological weapon.

►        BWC Implementation Support Unit does not have the resources or the capacity to keep up with advancements in bio-technology

Lack of Verification protocol:

Between 2001 and 2002, a decade of efforts dedicated to preparing for and negotiating a draft protocol to establish a permanent verification organization for the Biological Weapons Convention failed[9], with the U.S citing concerns of potential intellectual property theft and national security concerns.[10]

The conflict in Ukraine has significantly disrupted regional and global security, prompting worries about the possible deployment of unconventional weapons. A particularly alarming aspect is the extensive disinformation campaign by Russia, falsely claiming biological weapons development in Ukraine. This misinformation raises concerns about the potential use of chemical or biological weapons by Russia in Ukraine under the guise of a false flag operation (Kane, 2022). These allegations have underscored substantial shortcomings in the global biosecurity and pandemic preparedness framework. However, this should compel the international community to emphasize  the need for monitoring.

The Biological Weapons Convention has faced a longstanding deadlock of 21 years, marked by stalled negotiations on the critical issue of verification. The matter of verification holds significant importance for numerous countries, contributing to the persistent challenge in advancing the convention (Bencini, 2023). However, policy analysts believe that today, the perspective of international community towards verification has changed. It recognizes verification as encompassing any activity contributing to treaty implementation and ensure compliance with legal obligations (Findlay, n.d.).

Dual-Use Dilemma and Problems with Attribution

This dual-use nature of Biological weapons makes verification extremely complex and sensitive, as it can be difficult to distinguish between peaceful and military activities. There is urgent need for robust dual-use research supervision in synthetic biology, particularly in the private sector, to mitigate the risks associated with bioterrorism and misuse of advanced biotechnologies. However, the problem is multilayered. The absence of feasible options to thoroughly evaluate biological activities leads to a notable level of uncertainty. Determining an acceptable level of uncertainty for BWC verification remains a contentious issue.

Current Policy Discussions:

Since the last BWC Review Conference, several key discussions have emerged.

Verification Protocol: Proponents, including the US and UK, advocate for a legally binding protocol establishing a verification regime with site visits, data exchange, and challenge investigations. Opponents, notably Russia and China, raise concerns about potential for espionage and infringement on national sovereignty (Findlay, n.d.).

Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS): The IABS aims to address critical gaps in the BWC’s current framework by creating a dedicated multilateral organisation, accountable to UN Security council.

The IABS proposal has generated a diverse range of reactions. While some States Parties express strong support for the agency’s potential to fill vital gaps in global biosecurity, others raise concerns about its feasibility, scope, and governance structure (Zanders, 2020).

Proponents of the IABS argue that the agency would address urgent needs for improved verification, transparency, and risk assessment in the BWC framework and foster international cooperation and coordination in tackling biosecurity challenges. However, there are concerns about the potential duplication of existing structures and initiatives, leading to unnecessary bureaucracy and complexity as well as the challenges of reaching consensus on the agency’s mandate, governance, and funding mechanisms. The risk of politicization and misuse of the agency for political agendas has also sparked significant conversations and debates within the BWC community.

Policy Suggestions

The BWC working group’s[11] mandate involves formulating specific measures, potentially of a legally binding nature, and making recommendations to institutionalize all aspects of the convention within its purview. These options should be adopted by the working group for fulfilling the mandate.

►        Improving the functioning of BWC Implementation Support Unit by increasing inputs from bio-technology industry through an Industry Liaison Program

►        Funding inter-disciplinary research for improving capabilities of attribution.

►        Establishment of a Joint Assessment Mechanism for identifying the source of high-consequence biological occurrence of unknown origin.

Improving functioning of BWC ISU through strengthening Industry Ties

The current operational framework of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) involves the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) which supports State Parties in fulfilling their responsibilities to enact the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) into impactful national measures.

The primary challenge faced by the BWC and its Implementation Support Unit lies in the lack of input from industry experts regarding the latest developments in biotechnology, evolving threats, and strategies to foster capabilities for attribution, strengthen national preparedness for pandemics, and enhance laboratory security. While the working group engages in discussions on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention through working papers and suggestions from signatory countries, the absence of industry representatives poses the potential risk of these decisions becoming outdated quickly.

This policy suggests establishing an Industry Liaison Program within the ISU to bridge the gap between the BWC and the rapidly evolving biotechnology sector. The dynamic nature of science and technology necessitates continuous evaluation, particularly in the context of the BWC. However, the BWC Review Conference are unable to allocate sufficient time to comprehensively address the submitted science and technology papers and determining an effective framework for regular collective assessments between conferences. Establishing mechanisms for more frequent gatherings of scientific advisers is crucial to staying abreast of evolving developments and ensuring the BWC remains responsive and relevant.

This Industry Liaison Program would:

1. Foster direct engagement with industry experts: Facilitate regular consultations and information sharing with bio-technology companies, research institutions, and relevant associations. The industry experts possess invaluable knowledge and insights regarding latest developments in biotechnology. Their expertise is instrumental in understanding emerging threats and developing capabilities for attribution, enhancing national-level preparedness and improving laboratory security.

2. Strengthen ISU’s understanding of emerging threats and advancements: Enhance the ISU’s ability to assess potential risks, inform policy development, and support States Parties in implementing effective controls. By incorporating industry perspectives, the BWC Implementation support unit would gain a comprehensive understanding of the evolving landscape of biotechnological developments, ensuring that policy responses are not only effective but also up-to-date. Furthermore, industry ties would provide a direct link to technological advancements, allowing the BWC ISU to stay ahead of potential threats. As the biotechnology sector rapidly evolves, maintaining close connections with industry representatives enables the working group to proactively address challenges and devise preventive measures.

3. Contribute to improved verification and regulatory frameworks: Industry insights can guide the development of robust verification protocols and regulations to address challenges posed by new technologies. Collaborative efforts between policymakers and industry experts would foster an environment where relevant information can be shared promptly, contributing to the development of robust strategies for the prevention and control of harmful biotechnologies. Recognizing the intricate and specialized nature of verification processes, the inclusion of opinion of experts from various fields in pertinent discussions, alongside government representatives is also essential.

Feasibility and Implementation:

The recent COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the critical gap in attribution capabilities for biological incidents. This increased awareness can fuel support for research initiatives. Several international research institutions and networks already focus on infectious diseases and biosecurity, providing a foundation for collaboration.

The scientific community is already exploring the potential of DNA watermarks, unique synthetic DNA sequences embedded within a synthetic organism’s genome, as a method for identification and tracking. These sequences offer a promising avenue for isolating and tracing engineered organisms, acting as a valuable tool for biosecurity and potentially serving as genetic safeguards or firewalls against the misuse of synthetic biology (Fangzhong Wang, 2019).

Phased approach: The program could be piloted with a dedicated team within the ISU, focusing on key areas like synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and gene editing technologies. As the program proves successful, it could be expanded to cover a broader range of biotechnologies. The key challenge to this would be availability of resources. The ISU currently operates with a limited budget and staff. Securing additional funding and personnel dedicated to the program will be necessary.

Public-private partnerships: Collaborate with industry associations and research institutions to leverage resources and expertise. Ensuring data confidentiality, protecting intellectual property, and addressing potential conflicts of interest is essential.

Capacity building: Provide training and resources to States Parties to increase their understanding of emerging technologies and facilitate effective engagement with industry.

Supporting Inter-disciplinary research for developing capabilities of attribution
Inter-disciplinary research must be funded and supported for developing capabilities of attribution and increasingly gather insights and expertise crucial for effective verification.

This interdisciplinary approach would include inviting professionals, including microbiologists focusing on disease-causing agents, toxicologists researching virulent biological toxins, preventive medicine and epidemiological experts studying epidemic patterns, pharmaceutical experts and vaccinologists involved in drug and vaccine development, clinical experts in infectious diseases, bioinformatics experts tracing pathogen evolution, and biosafety experts overseeing high-containment laboratories and production units.

Moreover, to enhance the depth of knowledge and ensure a comprehensive approach, it is essential to tap into the expertise of relevant international organizations. Organizations such as the World Health Organization, World Organization for Animal Health, Secretariat of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations possess invaluable insights that can significantly contribute to the effectiveness of the verification process.

This collaborative engagement with a diverse range of experts and international organizations would strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention’s capacity to address the complexities of biotechnological advancements and reinforces its commitment to preventing the misuse of biological materials.

Funding Mechanisms: The key requirement is to secure dedicated funding through international organizations, public-private partnerships, and targeted grants. Since the technological capability for attribution would also have dual-use, one to identifying engineered pathogens and another to protect the intellectual property rights, the possibility of getting funding increases.

Research Hubs: Establishing regional or global research hubs with diverse expertise to facilitate collaboration and knowledge sharing, while having clarity on intellectual property rights is essential. Ensuring data confidentiality and addressing ethical considerations regarding sensitive biological materials will be critical. It would require laying down strict guidelines for violation of intellectual property and an oversight mechanism. Training and capacity building for scientists and policymakers in attribution techniques and interdisciplinary collaboration would be needed.

Likely to get support from States with advanced research capabilities: Leading scientific powers like the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany see attribution as a vital tool for deterring misuse of biological agents and upholding the BWC (Jenkins, 2022).

The World Health Organization (WHO) also recognizes the critical role of attribution in pandemic preparedness and outbreak response. They have collaborated on attribution research and endorse efforts to strengthen global capabilities[1].

Establishment of a Joint Assessment Mechanism:

The envisioned mechanism is designed to address situations where the origin of a biological incident is unclear, necessitating clarification on whether it occurred naturally or was released intentionally or accidentally from an academic, commercial, or government laboratory. The existing mechanisms like Article 7 investigations are cumbersome, politically charged, and lack rapid response capabilities.

In a report released in 2020, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in collaboration with international partners, also examined the potential establishment of a “joint assessment mechanism” aimed at identifying the source of high-consequence biological incidents with unknown origins. The study emphasized the crucial role of determining whether such outbreaks resulted from inadequate laboratory practices or intentional harm in shaping an effective international response.

However, the potential for establishing a joint assessment mechanism would gain better acceptance in post-COVID-19 world. The proposed Joint assessment mechanism would be a solution to provide the capability of verification and implementation of BWC. JAM’s composition would be of neutral scientific experts drawn from diverse disciplines and countries. It must have the ability to deploy quickly and gather evidence while the incident is still unfolding.

The proposal by NTI requires further refinement through consultations with international experts and stakeholders. A biosecurity risk classification system to address the potential weaponization of microorganisms or toxins was also proposed during the 2006 BWC conference.[2] This must be made part of JAM to identify key metrics which would put teams in motion.

Feasibility: Dedicated funding for personnel, equipment, travel, research, and operational costs would be required alongwith human resources including a team of scientists, epidemiologists, biosafety experts, data analysts, and administrative personnel. The same would require international support and broad backing from states, international organizations, and civil society.

Key requirement would be technical infrastructure to secure data storage, communication platforms, and analytical tools but it is likely to meet political resistance by nations with concerns about potential misuse or loss of sovereignty. Data sharing and privacy issues are also a consistent factor in conversations around JAM. However, setting clear norms for handling sensitive biological data and building trust is critical. Work must also be done to safeguard the mechanism against political interference and maintaining the JAM’s scientific integrity.

Implementation Pathways:

Transparency and accountability: Establish clear protocols for information sharing, decision-making, and reporting to maintain public trust.

Regular evaluation and adaptation: Continuously assess the JAM’s effectiveness and adapt its structure and methods based on feedback and evolving threats.

Key Recommendations

Each option has identifiable opportunities, risks and cost implications for States parties.

1. Investing in Interdisciplinary Research for Attribution Capabilities: Robust attribution methods are crucial for deterring malicious actors and holding them accountable. Interdisciplinary research, leveraging bioinformatics, epidemiology, and DNA watermarks, holds immense potential in this regard.

2. Strengthen Industry Linkages of BWC Implementation Support Unit: Improve connections with the industry to keep policymaking abreast of technological advancements and potential threats.

3. Establishing a Joint Assessment Mechanism: When the origin of a biological incident remains unclear, rapid and impartial assessment is critical. A neutral, science-driven JAM, composed of international experts, can provide accurate assessments and guide appropriate responses.

3. Prioritize Prevention over Cure: Establish a proactive system focused on preventing the development and use of harmful biotechnologies by introducing strategic disincentives that deter the misuse of biotechnological advancements, ensuring global biosecurity and preventing potential threats.

4. Advocate for an International Agency for Biological Safety: Continue diplomatic efforts towards establishing an International Agency for Biological Safety, providing centralized oversight and response mechanisms.

Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illuminated the vulnerabilities of our interconnected world to biological threats. Therefore, as the pace of technological advancement continues its rapid acceleration, strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) becomes more pertinent in addressing and mitigating risks and threats that have the potential to impact nations in an ever-more interconnected and globalized world.[1]

This policy brief has proposed three key strategies to bolster the BWC’s efficacy in the face of evolving threats: establishing a Joint Assessment Mechanism, constituting an industry-liason program to strengthen BWC ISU and funding inter-disciplinary research for developing capabilities of attribution.

These proposals, alongside continued commitment to existing BWC measures, offer a comprehensive approach to building a more resilient biosecurity architecture. However, this endeavor demands active participation from all stakeholders: states, international organizations, scientists, industry players, and civil society. Ignoring the need for a stronger BWC risks plunging our interconnected world into an era of perpetual vulnerability. The international community must engage in a collective effort to strengthen the BWC, ensuring its resilience in the face of modern biological threats and reinforcing global biosecurity for generations to come.

While the field of biotechnology is witnessing strides, the world is vulnerable to potential impacts of misuse of the same technology. With the adoption of the above-mentioned policies, the international community can remain one step ahead of the challenges and threats that emerge. Top of Form

[1] Biological Weapons Convention is referred to as BWC throughout the policy brief.
[2] The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) on Oct 18, 2023 https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3721.doc.htm

[2] This Policy brief bases its background on History of Biological Weapons Conventions, UNODA https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/about/history/#:~:text=The%20BWC%20was%20negotiated%20in%20Geneva%2C%20Switzerland%2C%20within,versions%20of%20a%20draft%20BWC%20in%20the%20CCD.
[3] Liang Huigang, Li Menghui, Zhu Xiaoli, Huang Cui, Yuan Zhiming, Development of and prospects for the biological weapons convention, Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, Volume 4, Issue 1, 2022, Pages 50-53, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobb.2021.11.003
[4] Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) on Global Catastrophic Biological Risks: https://nti.org/about/projects/global-catastrophic-biological-risks/
[5] Brian D. Nordmann, Issues in biosecurity and biosafety, International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, Volume 36, Supplement 1, 2010, Pages S66-S69, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2010.06.025.
[6] In 2017, reports emerged regarding the effective construction of a synthetic horsepox virus through the ordering of overlapping DNA fragments via mail
[7] The other threats included North Korea’s suspected nuclear detonation, Syria’s undeclared chemical weapons and new Russian cruise missiles
[8] The report represents the declassified summary of insights pooled from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and several other U.S. intelligence and information-gathering entities. While CRISPR is not explicitly named in the report, it is evident that James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, was alluding to this cutting-edge and versatile gene-editing system.
[9] Due to concerns over non-compliance and the lack of verification measures, an ad hoc group known as VEREX was formed at the third Review Conference in 1991. Over the following decade, there was a proposition to establish an international organization with a verification mechanism similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
[10] Michael Nguyen, “BWC Verification: A Decade-Long Detour?” Arms Control Today, April 2006, p. 16.
[11] During the 9th Review Conference of the BWC, a working group was established to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

[12] WHO R&D Blueprint for Epidemics https://www.who.int/teams/blueprint/who-r-and-d-blueprint-for-epidemics
[13] During the 2006 BWC conference, the German representative, on behalf of the European Union proposed Risk classification system.

[14] Statement by Ms. Federica Irene Falomi, Economic Affairs Officer at the BWC Ninth Review Conference 29 November 2022, Geneva

Bibliography

(n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcsig

Bencini, L. (2023, January). President Review Conference. (A. C. Today, Interviewer)

Bob Graham, J. T. (2011). Bio-Response Report Card. WMD Terrorism Research centre.

Fangzhong Wang, W. Z. (2019). Synthetic biology: Recent progress, biosafety and biosecurity. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, 22-30.

Fangzhong Wang, W. Z. (2019). Synthetic biology: Recent progress, biosafety and biosecurity concerns, and possible solutions. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity Vol 1 Issue 1, 22-30.

Findlay, T. (n.d.). Verification and the BWC: Last Gasp or Signs of Life? Retrieved from Arms Control Association: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-09/features/verification-bwc-last-gasp-signs-life

Findlay, T. (n.d.). Verification and the BWC: Last Gasp or Signs of Life? Retrieved from Arms Control today: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-09/features/verification-bwc-last-gasp-signs-life

Jenkins, A. B. (2022, Oct 6). Reducing Biological Threats: Science Diplomacy, Multisectoral and Security Cooperation. Retrieved from U.S Department of State: https://www.state.gov/reducing-biological-threats-science-diplomacy-multisectoral-and-security-cooperation/

Kane, A. (2022, Aug). A better way to detect the origins of a Pandemic. Retrieved from Arms Control Today: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-07/features/better-way-detect-origins-pandemic

Regalado, A. (2016, February 9). Top U.S. Intelligence Official Calls Gene Editing a WMD Threat. Retrieved from MIT Technology Review: https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/02/09/71575/top-us-intelligence-official-calls-gene-editing-a-wmd-threat/

Tao Sun, J. S. (2022). Challenges and recent progress in the governance of biosecurity risks in the era of synthetic biology. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, 59-67.

Zanders, J. (2020, Oct 6). Biological weapons: A surprise proposal from Kazakhstan worth exploring. Retrieved from The Trench: https://www.the-trench.org/bw-proposal-from-kazakhstan

Appendix

BWC- Biological Weapons Convention

ISU- Implementation Support Unit

JAM- Joint Assessment Mechanism

Jammu is the name of the entire Division with ten districts including Reasi (which is where Katra lies, the foothills of Trikuta mountains.) And Jammu is also the name of a district, one of the capitals of Jammu and Kashmir. This street food tour is about the entire Jammu division, so I will try to cover as much as I can.

Dhaam/Taam- A Dogra Culinary Feast

It is pointless to add a location with this unique cuisine of Dogra Culture. Mainly because Taam is not just a dish, it is a cultural phenomenon. It comprises Dogra dishes served on pattal and doona. Dishes like Ambal/Maani, Dal Patt, Rajma, Gheur/Keyur, Babroo, Malpuda are a must. So Taam is basically a mixture of different kinds of Dogra dishes served together. Add some sweetened rice on the side and it is a flavorful delight!

Girdhari Kachalu Wala

Kachalu Chat is another delicacy which is found mainly in Jammu, or perhaps nearby Himachal as well. This spicy and chatpati chaat is often accompanied with Kimb as well. And Girdhari Kachalu Wala has been in the business of making and serving Kachalu for decades. Though you can try kachalu chat being sold by small vendors all across Jammu. I would definitely recommend trying Girdhari ke Kachalu.

Rawal Pindi Sweet House

Rawal Pindi, the name that might remind you of our neighbouring country Pakistan, is a popular sweet shop of Jammu that will prove nostalgic for many Dogras. The Puri Channa of Rawalpindi used to be the Sunday breakfast of many households in Jammu city. The puri fried in Desi ghee, with spicy channa made for a delicious combination. The Sweet House also sells Malpudas, which are a delight during monsoons.

Lalli Shah Kulfi Waala

You might have tried Falooda in different places but Lali Shah di Matka Kulfi is something different. The noodle-like Lacchas are served separately from the Khoya Kulfi with some Roohafza on top. And though the rates have increased over the years, but the taste of the Kulfi remains the same.

SHARMA HOTEL BAGGAR WALE

Baggar is a spot, on way to Doda which serves the most delicious Rajma Chawal along with Anardana Chutney. Rajma Chawal is the favorite dish of people across North India and you will find hundreds of dhabas, restaurants or even high-end eateries serving Rajma Chawal. It is a go-to dish for many. But finding THE SPOT to get the authentic Rajma Chawal (with lots of desi ghee) taste is also not hard. There’s a spot called Peeda, on Jammu-Srinagar National Highway. There’s Sharma Hotel in Baggar enroute to Doda (another district of Jammu). Thankfully, they have another outlet in the heart of the city as well. Recently, Suketar which is known for its Paneer Pakoda and Chulhe wali chai has also started serving Rajma Chawal.

Udhampur ka Kalari Kulcha

Kalari is a type of mozarella cheese made from Buffalo milk. You will not find Kalari anywhere except for Jammu. And when I say Jammu, I mean the division. Kalari originated in Ramnagar of Udhampur district and even now, if you wish to try the authentic tasty Kalari, it is better to travel to Udhampur. Mame da Kulcha is a known eatery for trying out Kalari Kulcha.

All this is just tip of the iceberg. There are many other dishes and many other places where you can enjoy Dogra food. There is Lakhanpur ke Palle, Gucchi Mushrooms, City Chowk ka halwa and much more. But let’s start with this much!

Originally Published by Pallavi Sareen on Tripoto.

Jammu, Dec 11: The Jammu and Kashmir administration is planning to create an authentic database of all families in the Union territory with each of them having a unique alpha-numeric code – the objective being easy selection of eligible beneficiaries of various social welfare schemes.

The proposed move to allot “Family ID” has been welcomed by the BJP but slammed by other parties which raised concerns over personal data safety.

At the recent national conference on e-governance in Katra in Reasi district, Jammu and Kashmir Lt Governor Manoj Sinha and Chief Minister of Haryana Manohar Lal Khattar released the ‘Digital J&K Vision Document’, unveiling the government plan to create an authentic, verified and reliable database of all families of the Union territory.

According to the vision document, “Each family will be provided with a unique alpha-numeric code called JK Family ID. The data available in the family database would be used to determine eligibility through automatic selection of beneficiaries for receiving social benefits.”

“The database would identify each and every family in J&K and would collect the basic data of the family, provided with the consent of the family, in a digital format.” The document further reads that all the applicable laws and regulations in respect of data protection shall be complied with in the management of data.

To thwart risks and protect sensitive and critical data, it said the Jammu and Kashmir government plans to work on an information security policy and also envisages formulation of appropriate cyber security framework.

Commissioner Secretary of the IT Department Prerna Puri said the objective of creating the database, which will be at par with Haryana’s ‘Parivaar Pehchaan Patra’, is that families or individuals will not have to apply to receive benefits under each individual scheme.

“Once the data in the JK Family ID database is authenticated and verified, a beneficiary will not be required to submit any more document to avail a service,” she told PTI.

The Congress, National Conference and the PDP slammed the proposed move.

Congress chief spokesperson and former legislator Ravinder Sharma questioned the government’s intention and also its capacity to protect such digital databases from cyber attacks.

“Why does the government wish to peek into everything? They already have enough data through Aadhaar and are providing benefits through direct bank transfer (DBT) mode,” Mr Sharma said.

Referring to cyber attacks by Chinese entities and ransomware attack on the AIIMS servers, he said in such a situation, protection of personal data of the people is a major challenge.

National Conference provincial president Rattan Lal Gupta termed the exercise “unproductive use of resources”.

“They already have a database of every individual because of Aadhaar. So, creating another database is not fruitful…the administration is keeping the staff busy with data collection while people are left devoid of basic facilities,” he said.

The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) asked who the government wanted to identify through this database.

“There are a lot of problems in J&K which the government ignores. Now who the government is trying to identify through this database?” PDP leader Virendra Singh Sonu said.

However, the BJP welcomed the move and said the people who have to stand in queues to get various benefits and certificates will benefit once a verified database is prepared.

“The new database will be helpful in many ways as people have been alleging that Census 2011 was not correct and many people have been wrongly added under BPL category,” Ex-Deputy Chief Minister of J&K and BJP leader Kavinder Gupta said, adding a similar family database is already there in Haryana and so there is nothing to worry about.

The vision document itself acknowledges that in the absence of coherent policies relating to data security and privacy, the progress of digital transformation is bound to be slow and fraught with several risks.

Senior Superintendent of Police, Security, M Y Kichloo said vulnerabilities and possibilities of cyber attacks will remain when it comes to digital storage of data.

“We will face the same problems in Jammu and Kashmir which are faced across the country viz- a-viz data. Whenever a database is prepared by the government, an IT audit is conducted by experts,” he said.

As far as data protection is concerned, the officer said, the Jammu and Kashmir government will soon issue a notification under Section 70 of the Information Technology (IT) Act to declare all information structures of government offices and public sector undertakings as protected systems.

“In case of data breach, the quantum of punishment would be 10 years which would work as a deterrent,” M Y Kichloo said.

Chief Town Planner of the Jammu Development Authority Jagdish Raj Hans said the exercise would be helpful in more ways than just extending benefits of government schemes.

“Currently, JDA is conducting a socio-economic survey for revising the master plan and a door-to-door survey of nearly 9,000 households is being undertaken with the help of a Delhi-based consultancy firm. If a bigger database with all social indicators of families of J&K becomes available, then we would not have to do this sample survey,” he said. According to the vision document, over the next five years the government aims to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and equitability in the delivery of public services and all the functions of the government using emerging technologies.

Every family in J-K to get unique ID BJP welcomes move other parties raise concerns

By Pallavi Sareen Jammu, Dec 11 (PTI) The Jammu and Kashmir administration is planning to create an authentic database of all families in the Union territory with each of them having a unique alpha-numeric code — the objective being easy selection of eligible beneficiaries of various social welfare schemes.

Originally Published on Ptinews.com on December 11, 2022

At the age of 20, she founded ‘The Straight Line’, a digital media organization. Schwarzman Scholars, located at Schwarzman College on the campus of Tsinghua University in Beijing, announced its eighth cohort.
From an initial pool of nearly 3,000 applicants, the admissions team selected 151 Schwarzman Scholars from 36 countries and 121 universities.

Each year, up to 200 future leaders from US, China and rest of the world matriculate as Schwarzman Scholars at Tsinghua University in Beijing to pursue a one-year Masters Degree.
Stephen A. Schwarzman, Founding Trustee of Schwarzman Scholars said, “As the geopolitical landscape grows more complex each day, I am inspired by this year’s selected Scholars and their readiness to engage thoughtfully with global issues and drive change. We are confident that this inspiring cohort of young leaders will make the most of this unique opportunity.”

Scholars were selected through a rigorous application process designed to identify leadership potential, intellect and strength of character. Over 400 candidates from 60 countries were invited to interview with panels of CEOs, government officials, university presidents, journalists and non-profit executives, among others.
“The accomplishments of the admitted class already are truly outstanding,” said Cordel Faulk, Director of Global Admissions.

First Jammu woman wins ‘Schwarzman’ Scholarship – Asian News from UK

This scholarship was started in 1902 by Stephen Schwarzman, inspired by the Rhodes Scholarship, a scholarship to promote world understanding and peace….reports ALTAF HUSSAIN JANJUA Funded by American billionaire Stephen Schwarzman, ‘Schwarzman Scholars’ is one of the few top scholarships in the world, for which thousands of candidates from all over the world submit applications