The relationship between China and India, two Asian giants, has long been marked by a complex interplay of cooperation and competition. However, recent years have witnessed a significant escalation in tensions. China, accustomed to blocking access to outside information, now faces the unique challenge of being on the receiving end of similar restrictions from India (Reuters 2022).
The 2020 Indian government ban on Chinese apps, including TikTok and WeChat, in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley clash, reflects a complex interplay of national security concerns, geopolitical tensions, and domestic digital ambitions, exacerbating the Indo-Chinese divide. The ban on Chinese apps in India marks a shift in the dynamic between the two countries and highlights attempts to restrict people-to-people contact through information control. This article explores the multifaceted implications of the ban on Chinese apps by Indian government in June 2020, in the aftermath of the fatal clash at the disputed Himalayan border that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers. (Post 2020). Immediately after the clash, more than 59 Chinese apps were banned, and today the number of banned apps has risen up to 138 (Nigam 2023). However, China’s reaction to the ban did not involve economic sanctions or any muscular approach, indicating its neighborhood diplomacy approach.
Techno-Nationalism or Trust Deficit?
Amidst heightened nationalist sentiment, the Indian government cited cybersecurity concerns (BBC 2020) as the primary justification, claiming potential threats to national security and user data posed by these apps. However, a deeper examination reveals a more intricate picture. While security concerns are undoubtedly a factor, the sheer scale and speed of the bans point towards a broader agenda. From Tiktok holding 40% of India’s app market to complete absence in the top 500 (Bhaya 2020) – this shift isn’t merely a defensive posture. For millions of Indian users, popular apps like TikTok and WeChat (a vital communication tool for the Indian Chinese community and Indian businessmen) became inaccessible, causing significant disruption and inconvenience. This lack of information exchange and curtailed communication channels further widen the gap between the two nations, hindering people-to-people contact. The “Boycott China” fervor and hyper-nationalist destruction videos (Jazeera 2020)[1] of smartphone and LED smashing suggest a public primed for this tech-centric patriotism.
However, the nationalist fervor did not have much effect on the trade relations between the two countries since despite simmering geopolitical tensions, mainland China dethroned the US as India’s top trading partner in fiscal 2021 (Banerji 2021). In 2022 and 2023, U.S. continued to be India’s largest trading partner (BusinessToday 2023), but China was a close second (Suneja 2021).
The deeper economic interdependence transcended geopolitical frictions, despite calls from trade organizations to boycott imports of Chinese goods (BusinessToday 2023). Considering that the techno-nationalism didn’t materialize into India’s lowered dependence on China, what it did contribute towards was establishing the trust deficit that existed between the countries. The ban on Chinese apps might appear as a temporary ripple, but it underscores a deeper disquiet in the Indo-Chinese relationship. Both nations stand at a crossroads: bridge the trust deficit eroded by Galwan Valley or risk an irreversible economic and cultural decoupling.
Domestic Digital Ambitions and Cyber Sovereignty: The ban also showcased a deliberate attempt to foster domestic alternatives and reclaim digital sovereignty by India. Take TikTok, with almost a third of its downloads coming from India. With over 120 million Indian users who relied on the platform for entertainment, communication, and even income generation, the ban undoubtedly hurts China’s interests, but also impacted Indian consumers. Yet the ban can also be seen as an attempt to assert control over India’s domestic information space and mitigate the perceived threat of Chinese dominance.
While the ban might appear protectionist to an outside observer, (Kumar 2023) argues that India’s approach to digital sovereignty emphasizes building a strong domestic digital infrastructure rather than solely excluding foreign platforms. The app ban merges well with Prime Minister Modi’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” vision of economic self-reliance and aligns with India’s broader efforts to promote its own digital ecosystem.
The Indian government actively pushes for the development of indigenous social media platforms, even finding alternatives to U.S-based apps such as Koo as a replacement for Twitter, and Moj to replace TikTok (Menon 2021). By curtailing access to Chinese alternatives, and encourages domestic technology companies, the government hopes to create a fertile ground for domestic players to flourish. India has historically been wary of Chinese influence, amplified by the unresolved border dispute. The increasing Chinese digital presence, particularly through popular apps like TikTok, raised suspicion among Indian policymakers leading to India adopting a tactic long employed by China in the realm of internet access and information control.
Citing national security concerns and data misuse by “elements hostile to India,” the government cracked down on the popular platform (Guardian 2022). While this tactic might offer a temporary economic advantage for India, it ultimately feeds into China’s grand strategy of a divided digital world, where national borders dictate online access and information flow. It also appears that India’s domestic politics which is characterized by increase in hyper-nationalism fueled by the ruling party—the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) is working towards gaining control over information-sharing platforms to curtail any dissent or criticism of the ruling party (World Report 2023). This tightening grip on digital spaces is an attempt to isolate the Indian population from the global flow of ideas and knowledge. The ban on apps like We-Chat which was used as key platform for communication by Indian businessmen with their Chinese counterparts also appears to be a deliberate attempt at hindering people-to-people contact between India and China (Sharma 2024).
Geopolitical Considerations
While cybersecurity concerns hold merit, the timing and nature of the ban suggest that geopolitical factors played a significant role. The attempts to deliberately shift away from dependence on its larger neighbor, China could be seen in India’s recent spate of actions, including restrictions on Chinese investments, customs duty hikes, and infrastructure bans (Reuters 2023). India perceives China as a rising regional hegemon, flexing its muscles in areas like the South China Sea and Belt and Road Initiative. The ban sends a message of resistance against this dominance, asserting India’s own regional aspirations and preventing China from establishing unchecked influence. This move aligns with India’s broader efforts to forge closer ties with other democracies like the US and Japan, forming a counterbalance to China’s regional ambitions (Bala 2023).
India seeks to reduce its dependence on China’s manufacturing and trade dominance. The app ban is a symbolic step towards reducing dependence on Chinese technology and building a more self-reliant digital ecosystem (MacRae 2022). This could lead to India promoting domestic alternatives and diversifying its trade partnerships, potentially leading to a more balanced economic relationship with China in the long run. The ban also addresses concerns about Chinese tech companies potentially collecting sensitive data on Indian users and potentially sharing it with the Chinese government (Reuters 2022). This is a growing concern globally, especially with the rise of artificial intelligence and data-driven technologies. By taking control of its own digital space, India seeks to protect its national security and ensure data privacy for its citizens. India and China have historically battled for influence in their shared neighborhood. This historical competition persists today, fueling anxieties about each other’s ambitions and making it difficult to collaborate on regional issues.
Historical Memory: The historical context of the Indo-Chinese relationship further complicates the situation. The 1962 war remains a raw nerve for India, a symbol of national humiliation and betrayal. Memories of defeat feed into anxieties about Chinese intentions, making it difficult to fully trust their motives (Lidarev 2022). Every political dispute or border skirmish rekindles these anxieties, hindering progress towards amicable relations. (Lidarev 2022) explains how the war continues to shape India’s foreign policy, giving it a more muscular and realist edge.
Memories of the past are not just confined to history books. They are passed down through generations, shaping public perception and attitudes. Parents who lived through the 1962 war instill their anxieties and experiences in their children, perpetuating mistrust towards China. One way of changing that perception would have come through people-to-people contact. However, these linkages have not been fostered. What existed in the form of business relationships was also eroded through the app bans (Sharma 2024).
The India-China app ban should not be viewed merely a tech spat, but a collision of historical narratives and national aspirations contributing towards reducing linkages between populations of both countries. Recognizing the role of historical memory in shaping both nations’ actions is crucial for understanding the motivations behind the ban and its potential ramifications.
The specter of the 1962 war persistently overshadows the bilateral ties, imprinting a profound impact on the relationship. The collective psyche of India perceives this military setback as a national dishonor, thereby fostering an ingrained sense of mistrust and vulnerability towards China. This perception significantly influences India’s diplomatic stance and strategic decisions concerning China. (Lidarev 2022). Furthermore, the unresolved border issue remains a constant source of tension. The legacy of disputed territories like Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin keeps the embers of suspicion alive, making it difficult for either side to fully trust the other’s claims. This sentiment finds resonance in the widespread public support for the app ban, seen as a necessary safeguard against potential Chinese digital incursion.
Historical memory for both nations extends beyond just moments of defeat. India’s cultural identity is deeply intertwined with a long history of independent civilization, fueling a desire for self-reliance and freedom from undue foreign influence. Similarly, China looks back on its ancient empires and cultural contributions, nurturing a sense of rightful global prominence. These interwoven narratives of past glory and national pride create fertile ground for clashes over issues like technology and national security (Agarwalla 2020).
By analyzing the India-China app ban through the lens of historical memory, we move beyond superficial interpretations of a tech dispute. We see it as a complex interplay of national anxieties and aspirations, rooted in centuries of experience. The recent clash and the app ban have exacerbated these historical tensions, making it increasingly difficult for the two countries to find common ground. Media narratives and political discourses further play on historical anxieties, manipulating public opinion and exacerbating the trust deficit. Nationalist rhetoric, demonizing the other nation hinders mutual understanding and reconciliation.
Beyond mere political fallout, historical memory breeds anxieties that directly impact trust on a human level, such as the family ties across the border become strained due to political tensions, cultural exchanges and academic collaborations face the burden of suspicion. Even people-to-people contact is hampered by the weight of historical baggage (Lidarev 2012).
China’s reaction
China’s official response has been measured but critical. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed “strong concern” over the ban, calling it “discriminatory” and a violation of World Trade Organization rules (CGTN 2021). They urged India to reverse the decision and uphold the “legitimate rights and interests” of Chinese companies. Beyond official statements, China raised this issue at WTO (World Trade Organization) claiming discrimination (Mishra 2021).
Nationalist sentiment in China fueled calls for stronger countermeasures against India, and while China has used economic leverage in their foreign affairs strategy (Hu 2013), China has also shown restraint in some areas. Despite the economic losses from the app ban, China has not imposed large-scale economic sanctions on India, and it hasn’t had a significant impact on the trade relations between the two countries (Chen 2023). However, while China refrained from large-scale sanctions, it implemented targeted measures like visa restrictions and permit delays for Indian companies, impacting bilateral trade and investments. They also discouraged Chinese tourism to India and imposed an enduring travel ban barring Indian visitors, including thousands of stranded students (Krishnan 2021). This could be due to several factors, such as a desire to avoid escalating tensions further or hoping for a future diplomatic solution. The government’s actions also seek to appease domestic demands while balancing pragmatic considerations.
China’s response can be analyzed as a way to maintain leverage and signal disapproval of India’s perceived strategic realignment towards the US. But it’s important to note that China values its relationship with India, given the latter’s growing economic and strategic importance in the region. Despite the tensions, China called for a “fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory” trade pattern with India, indicating its willingness to resolve the issues. Such approach is hallmark of China’s foreign relations in which tensions with neighbor countries isn’t allowed to blow out of proportions, as China considers having a “secure neighborhood” as key for stability (CGTN 2023).
Analysis
Having long held a near-monopoly on domestic information flow, China is now encountering the unfamiliar territory of its own apps being subject to restrictions in another nation, potentially igniting a new battleground in the ongoing struggle for control over internet spaces. India’s decision to mirror China’s tactics in the digital sphere risks further fragmenting the internet and weaponizing access to information, potentially leading to a race to the bottom in terms of online freedoms.
But the ban on Chinese apps is a symptom of the deeper tensions plaguing the Indo-Chinese relationship. While cybersecurity concerns provide a veneer of justification, geopolitical factors and the quest for digital sovereignty as part of national security are the underlying drivers. The ban demonstrates India’s willingness to take a firm stance against perceived threats from China, even if it carries economic or technological costs. This sends a strong message to both domestic and international audiences about India’s rising assertiveness on the global stage. This move could also be seen as a way to pressure China to address India’s concerns on other issues, like border disputes or trade imbalances.
The consequences of the ban are far-reaching, impacting not only individuals and businesses but also the broader bilateral relationship. The ban creates an uncertain business environment for Chinese companies looking to invest in India, potentially hindering economic relations. It also adds another layer of complexity to already strained diplomatic relations, making it more difficult to resolve existing issues and hindering progress towards bilateral cooperation.
Footnotes:
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3e7irVQG1wo&ab_channel=AlJazeeraEnglish
[2] India-China in 2023: Bilateral Trade and Investment Prospects – India Briefing News (india-briefing.com)
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